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Should Courts Impose RICO's Pretrial Restraint Measures 
on Substitute Assets? 
James M. Rosenthal 
INTRODUCTION 
When Congress enacted the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (RIC0)1 in 1970 to curb the infiltration of or-
ganized crime into legitimate business, it resurrected an old com-
mon law punishment: in personam asset forfeiture.2 As originally 
enacted, RICO mandated that upon conviction a defendant had to 
forfeit all of his assets that were "tainted" by a connection with the 
crime.3 Any proceeds derived from or involved with the racketeer-
ing activity would be deemed tainted and thus potentially forfeit-
1. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (RICO), Pub. L No. 91-452, §§ 1961-68, 84 Stat. 
922, 941, 943. For background information on RICO, see Tracey Doherty et al., Project, 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 769 (1994). For addi-
tional but somewhat outdated background on RICO, see G. Robert Blakey & Brian Get-
tings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts - Criminal 
and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009 (1980). Blakey and Gettings provide an especially 
comprehensive analysis of the legislative history surrounding RICO's enactment in 1970. Id. 
at 1014-21. Their insight is particularly valuable because they both had substantial involve-
ment in the drafting of RICO. Blakey was the Chief Counsel of the Senate Subcommittee on 
Criminal Laws and Procedures at the time RICO was enacted, and Gettings was Counsel and 
Director of the House Republican Conference Task Force on Crime during the period in 
which RICO's legislative precursors were considered. 
2. For a discussion of the historical developments in forfeiture law, see Craig W. Palm, 
RICO Forfeiture and the Eighth Amendment: When is Everything Too Much?, 53 U. Prrr. L. 
REV. 1, 6-13 (1991) and Michael Todd King, Note, Expanding the Courts' Power to Preserve 
Forfeitable Assets: The Pretrial Restraint of Substitute Assets Under RICO and CCE, 29 GA. 
L. REV. 245, 247-50 (1994). 
The use of forfeiture as a criminal sanction has its roots in ancient Greek, Roman, and 
Judaic law. See Bruce A. Baird & Carolyn P. Vinson, RICO Pretrial Restraints and Due 
Process: The Lessons of Princeton/Newport, 65 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1009, 1009 n.2 (1990). 
Although in personam forfeitures were relatively frequent at early common law, they essen-
tially disappeared as a form of punishment in American courts during the nineteenth century, 
until readopted by RICO in 1970. See Palm, supra, at 10-11. 
There are two types of forfeiture orders: in personam and in rem. In personam forfeiture 
actions are imposed on the defendant as a form of punishment The defendant must first be 
convicted of a crime before forfeiture may be ordered. In rem forfeiture, on the other hand, 
involves a proceeding against the property itself, and thus does not require a conviction as a 
predicate event. RICO's forfeiture provisions are in personam, since they are entered against 
the defendant only after a conviction. Id. at 6-7. 
3. The original RICO forfeiture provision provided that upon conviction, a defendant: 
shall forfeit to the United States (1) any interest he has acquired or maintained in viola-
tion of section 1962, and (2) any interest in, security of, claim against, or property or 
contractual right of any kind affording a source of influence over, any enterprise which 
he has established, operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in 
violation of section 1962. 
RICO,§ 1963(a), 84 Stat 922, 943 (amended by the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, 
ch. 3, sec. 302, § 1963(a), Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 2040). 
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able upon a :finding of guilt. For example, if an individual earned 
ten thousand dollars from his participation in racketeering and sub-
sequently used the funds to purchase an automobile, it would be 
subject to forfeiture upon conviction as tainted property. More-
over, in order to ensure that the defendant's property would be ob-
tainable in the event of a forfeiture order, RICO included a limited 
pretrial restraint provision permitting courts to enter restraining or-
ders against assets potentially subject to forfeiture.4 
In the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act {CFA) of 1984,s Congress 
significantly amended RICO's forfeiture section in an effort to bol-
ster the war against organized crime by attacking its economic base. 
In the CFA, Congress responded to concerns that prosecutors un-
derutilized RICO's forfeiture provisions.6 A principal feature of 
this attempt to promote the use of asset forfeiture was the expan-
sion of RICO's pretrial restraint powers. Before the 1984 Act, 
courts could order restraints only after the filing of an indictment or 
information.1 Because defendants were often aware of potential 
RICO prosecutions before formal charges were brought, they were 
usually able to protect their tainted assets from forfeiture by con-
cealing them from the court.8 Congress addressed this problem in 
1984 by amending RICO's pretrial restraint provision to permit the 
imposition of restraints before an indictment or information.9 
4. RICO originally pennitted district courts "to enter restraining orders or prohibitions, 
or to take such other actions, including, but not limited to, the acceptance of satisfactory 
perfonnance bonds, in connection with any property or other interest subject to forfeiture 
under this section, as it shall deem proper." RICO,§ 1963(b), 84 Stat. 922, 943 (amended by 
the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, ch. 3, sec. 302, § 1963(b), Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 
Stat 1837, 2040-41; current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d) (1984)). 
5. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 2040 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1963). 
6. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 191 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 
3374. The Senate report discusses a 1981 General Accounting Office study that attributed 
the underutilization problem in large measure to the forfeiture provisions' numerous limita· 
tions. Id. The report asserts that "[t]his bill is intended to eliminate the statutory limitations 
and ambiguities that have frustrated active pursuit of forfeiture by Federal law enforcement 
agencies." Id. at 3375; see also United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1488 (10th Cir. 1988) 
(discussing the limitations inherent in RICO's original forfeiture provisions). 
7. In the federal system, an indictment by grand jury is required before any felony prose-
cution. Infonnations are filed as an alternative charging instrument where the defendant has 
waived his right to a grand jury. The primary difference between an indictment and an infor-
mation is its source. Grand juries issue indictments, but infonnations are issued by a prose-
cutor. See generally WAYNER. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 25 
(2d ed. 1992). 
8. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 202, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3385; see 
also Nichols, 841 F.2d at 1488-89 (attributing the ineffectiveness of RICO's forfeiture sanc-
tions during the 1970s in large measure to the government's policy of routinely notifying 
defendants of pending grand jury investigations, which enabled such individuals to transfer or 
conceal assets before an indictment was returned). 
9. RICO's pretrial restraint provision has remained substantially unchanged since the 
1984 Act. The 1984 amendment was enacted as subsection (e), but in 1986 Congress 
redesignated it as subsection (d). See Criminal Law and Procedure Technical Amendment 
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1\vo years later, Congress again amended RICO to provide for 
the forfeiture of assets unconnected with the RICO offense when 
the defendant's tainted assets are unavailable.10 For instance, a per-
son convicted of a racketeering offense may have purchased a home 
years before the crime took place with money earned from a legiti-
mate job. Under the so-called substitute asset provision, such prop-
erty is available for forfeiture when assets directly tainted by the 
crime are unavailable at the time of conviction. As with the 1984 
expansion of pretrial restraints, this substitute asset provision 
sought to strengthen RICO's forfeiture powers by enabling courts 
to enter forfeiture orders even when the defendant had successfully 
concealed his tainted assets. 
Although it is clear that substitute assets are forfeitable after 
conviction, there is considerable uncertainty in the federal courts 
about whether substitute assets may be subjected to pretrial re-
straint. RICO's pretrial restraint provision explicitly applies to 
tainted property, but it is silent regarding substitute assets.11 Both 
the Second12 and Fourth13 Circuits have ruled that RICO's pretrial 
restraint measures may be applied to substitute assets. The Third 
Circuit has disagreed, refusing to apply RICO's pretrial restraint 
provision to substitute assets.14 
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-646, sec. 23(3), § 1963, 100 Stat 3592, 3597. This Note shall refer 
to the pretrial restraint provision by its current location, subsection (d). 
10. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m) (1988). The substitute asset provision was originally enacted in 
subsection (n), but two years later Congress redesignated it as subsection (m). See Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, sec. 7034(b), § 1963(d), 102 Stat. 4181, 4398. 
As with the pretrial restraint provision, this Note shall refer to the substitute asset provision 
by its current location, subsection (m). 
11. Section 1963(d)(l) permits courts to "take ••. action to preserve the availability of 
property described in subsection (a) for forfeiture." 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(l) (1988). Subsec-
tion (a) describes tainted property. See infra text accompanying note 26 for the text of sub-
section (a). 
12. See United States v. Regan, 858 F.2d 115, 121 {2d Cir. 1988). In remanding considera-
tion of a restraining order to the district court, the Second Circuit advised that if the nature 
of the defendant's potentially forfeitable property was such that the entry of pretrial re-
straints would prove burdensome on third parties, the district court could restrain substitute 
assets instead. 
13. See In re Billman, 915 F.2d 916, 921 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom. McKinney 
v. United States, 500 U.S. 952 (1991). In Billman, the defendant had transferred $22,000,000 
earned in violation of RICO to a Swiss bank account and then fled the country shortly before 
the grand jury returned an indictment against him. While out of the country, the defendant 
transferred approximately $500,000 to a third party in the United States. After uncovering 
evidence of this transfer, the government sought a restraining order on the $500,000. Be-
cause the government was unable to prove that the transferred funds were actually RICO 
proceeds, the district court, and the Fourth Circuit on appeal, assumed that the money was 
not connected with the defendant's illegal conduct The Fourth Circuit nevertheless con-
cluded that the restraint was permissible. 
14. See In re Assets of Martin, 1 F.3d 1351, 1359 (3d Cir. 1993). Martin arose from the 
government's investigation of certain schemes to evade excise taxes on diesel fuel in violation 
of RICO. Concerned that the targets of the investigation would transfer or conceal poten-
tially forfeitable assets, the government successfully sought the entry of various preindict-
ment restraining orders, claiming that there was in excess of $15,000,000 in forfeitable 
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A similar controversy about the propriety of the pretrial re-
straint of substitute assets has arisen under the Continuing Criminal 
Enterprise statute (CCE).15 The forfeiture provisions of the CCE 
are essentially identical to those of RICQ.16 As with RICO, federal 
courts disagree as to whether the CCE's pretrial restraint measures 
extend to substitute assets. The Fifth17 and Ninthls Circuits have 
held that the statute's pretrial restraint provision does not reach 
substitute assets.19 By contrast, several district courts in other cir-
cuits have permitted the application of the CCE's pretrial restraint 
measures to substitute property.20 Because courts generally treat 
proceeds. The subsequent indictment, however, alleged that only $6,000,000 were forfeitable 
profits. The difference between these sums thus had no demonstrated connection to the 
RICO offense and was deemed to be substitute assets. The Martin court concluded that 
restraints could not be entered on the portion of the money that had no known connection 
with the illegal activity. 1 F.3d at 1362. 
15. 21 U.S.C. § 848 {1988). The forfeiture provisions of the CCE are found in 21 U.S.C. 
§ 853 (1988). The forfeiture section of the CCE is also used for the crimes for which forfei-
ture is authorized by the United States' general criminal forfeiture statute, 18 U.S.C. § 982 
(1982). Section 982 incorporates by reference § 853. 
16. See, e.g., United States v. Ripinsky, 20 F.3d 359, 362 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994) (observing 
that "[t]he provisions of§ 853 are substantially identical to RICO's criminal forfeiture provi-
sions found at 18 U.S.C. § 1963"); United States v. Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. 1191, 1195 n.2 
(E.D. Va. 1986) (concluding that "18 U.S.C. § 1963 is ••• a mirror of 21 U.S.C. § 853"); S. 
REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 209, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N at 3392 (noting that the 
1984 amendments to the CCE's forfeiture provisions are "in nearly all respects, identical to 
the RICO criminal forfeiture statute as amended"). The CCE's tainted assets provision is 
found at§ 853(a); its pretrial restraint measures are found at§ 853(e); and its substitute asset 
provision lies at§ 853(p). The principal difference between the RICO and CCE statutes is 
that only the CCE statute has a rebuttable presumption provision, which requires the govern-
ment to meet a preponderance of the evidence standard to obtain a forfeiture. See United 
States v. Elgersma, 971 F.2d 690, 696 (11th Cir. 1992) (discussing this difference). This dis-
tinction is not relevant to this Note's discussion of pretrial restraint powers. 
17. See United States v. Floyd, 992 F.2d 498, 501 (5th Cir. 1993). In Floyd, the defendant, 
a former bank president, conspired to loan a total of $1,960,000 to a real estate developer in 
exchange for a $450,000 payoff. The loans exceeded the bank's lending limits, and in an 
attempt to keep these loans secret, the defendant violated several other banking laws. Upon 
the issuance of an indictment, the government sought the entry of CCE's § 853(e)(l)(A) 
restraints for up to $1,960,000, claiming that this amount would be subject to forfeiture in the 
event of a conviction. The government acknowledged that the defendant did not actually 
have the tainted $1,960,000 in his possession and that the restrained money would be substi-
tute assets. The district court agreed that it could impose pretrial restraints on substitute 
assets but limited its restraining order to the $450,000, because it was not convinced that the 
full $1,960,000 would be forfeitable upon conviction. 992 F.2d at 499. On appeal, the Fifth 
Circuit vacated the district court's order. 
18. See Ripinsky, 20 F.3d at 363. In Ripinsky, the government sought a restraining order 
of over $1,000,000 against of the defendant who was facing prosecution for fraudulent activi-
ties. It was undisputed that the money in question had no connection to the illegal conduct. 
The Nmth Circuit denied the request. 
19. In addition, one district court in the Eighth Circuit has declined to extend § 853's 
pretrial restraint powers to substitute assets. See United States v. Field, 867 F. Supp. 869, 873 
(D. Minn. 1994). 
20. See United States v. O'Brien, 836 F. Supp. 438, 441 (S.D. Ohio 1993); United States v. 
Wu, 814 F. Supp. 491, 493 (E.D. Va. 1993); United States v. Swank Corp., 797 F. Supp. 497, 
500-502 (E.D. Va. 1993); United States v. Skiles, 715 F. Supp. 1567, 1568 (N.D. Ga. 1989). In 
addition, a magistrate in the eastern district of Wisconsin has permitted the imposition of 
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the forfeiture provisions of RICO and the CCE as interchange-
able,21 this Note relies on the case law of both statutes; for the sake 
of simplicity, however, its discussion is limited to whether courts 
may order the pretrial restraint of substitute assets under RIC0.22 
This Note argues that courts should not apply RICO's pretrial 
restraint measures to substitute assets. Part I examines the text of 
RICO's forfeiture provisions in light of recent rulings by the 
Supreme Court providing guidance in interpreting the statute. Part 
I concludes that the statute's plain meaning limits pretrial restraint 
measures to tainted assets. Part II examines language in the legisla-
tive history of an earlier attempt to add a substitute asset provision 
to RICO and in the 1984 change from broad to specific language in 
the pretrial restraint provision. From this language, Part II con-
cludes that Congress did not intend for the pretrial restraint provi-
sion to apply to substitute assets. Finally, Part Ill examines the 
difference between tainted and substitute assets in light of the 
greater concern for defendants' property rights that is manifested in 
the earlier stages of RICO prosecutions. Part III contends that the 
potential hardships associated with restraining orders and the risk 
of erroneous deprivation are good reasons for differentiating be-
tween tainted and substitute assets for purposes of pretrial re-
straints. This Note concludes that when a court finds that a portion 
of a defendant's tainted assets is unavailable before trial, it should 
not try to compensate for this missing sum.by restraining substitute 
assets. · 
§ 853's pretrial restraint measures upon substitute assets. See United States v. Schmitz, 153 
F.R.D. 136, 141 (E.D. Wis. 1994). 
21. RICO and the CCE were both originally enacted as part of the same bill in 1970. See 
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat 922, 943. In 1984, the 
CFA amended § 853 in the same fashion as § 1963. See Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, sec. 413, § 853, 98 Stat. 1837, 2044-45. In fact, § 853's legislative 
history incorporates § 1963's legislative record. In discussing the amendments to § 853's pre-
trial restraint provisions, the 1984 Senate report refers the reader to the discussion of RICO's 
pretrial restraint measures. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 213, reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3396. Consequently, courts and commentators treat forfeiture issues arising 
under RICO and the CCE as interchangeable. See, e.g., Ripins_ky, 20 F.3d at 362 n.3 (assert-
ing that "[w]e therefore refer to cases and legislative history discussing § 1963 and § 853 
interchangeably"); In re Martin, 1 F.3d 1351, 1358 (3d Cir. 1993) (treating cases dealing with 
RICO's forfeiture provisions as relevant precedent for an issue arising under § 853); In re 
Moffitt, Zwerling & Kemler, 864 F. Supp. 527, 532 n.10 (E.D. Va. 1994) (concluding that it is 
settled that "decisions interpreting the RICO forfeiture provisions are persuasive authority 
on the interpretation and application of§ 853"); Palm, supra note 2, at 2 n.2 ("[T]he judicial 
decisions concerning forfeiture under the CCE are generally instructive with respect to the 
counterpart provisions in RICO."). 
22. Given the similarities between § 1963 and § 853, the conclusions this Note reaches 
with regard to RICO should logically apply to the CCE's forfeiture provisions as well. 
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I. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF RICO'S FORFEITURE PROVISIONS 
The Supreme Court has held that construction of RICO, like 
construction of other statutes, should begin by looking at the lan-
guage of the statute.23 Unambiguous language is conclusive in the 
absence of a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary,24 
This Part examines the statutory language of RICO's forfeiture sec-
tion to determine whether courts may enter restraining orders 
against substitute property. Section I.A focuses on section 1963( d), 
the pretrial restraint provision, and concludes that the wording of 
this subsection unambiguously indicates that RICO's pretrial re-
straint measures do not apply to substitute assets. Section l.B con-
siders the language and structure of the entire forfeiture section to 
provide a meaningful context for the specific language of section 
1963( d). This section concludes that reading the statute as a whole 
confirms the view that section 1963( d) is not designed to apply to 
substitute assets. Finally, section I.C argues that RICO's liberal 
construction mandate does not alter this statutory analysis. This 
Part concludes that the statutory language of section 1963 indicates 
that RICO does not provide for the pretrial restraint of substitute 
assets. 
A. An Examination of RICO's Pretrial Restraint Provision 
Section 1963( d), RICO's pretrial restraint provision, states that 
a court may enter a restraining order "to preserve the availability of 
property described in subsection (a) for forfeiture."25 Subsection 
(a) defines tainted assets and makes no reference to substitute 
assets: 
(1) any interest the person has acquired or maintained in violation of 
section 1962; 
(2) any-
(A) interest in; 
(B) security of; 
( C) claim against; or 
(D) property or contractual right of any kind affording a source of 
influence over; 
any enterprise which the person has established, operated, controlled, 
conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in violation of section 
1962; and 
23. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981) (citing Consumer Prod. Safety 
Commn. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 {1980)). 
24. 452 U.S. at 580. 
25. 18 U.S.C. § 1963{d){l) (1988) (emphasis added). 
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(3) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds which 
the person obtained, directly or indirectly, from racketeering activity 
or unlawful debt collection in violation of section 1962.26 
Substitute assets are defined in subs~ction (m) as any property of 
the defendant not already identified as a tainted asset under subsec-
tion (a).27 Thus, RICO's pretrial restraint measure refers only to 
subsection (a) - the tainted asset subsection, not subsection (m) 
- the substitute assets subsection. The plain language of this pro-
vision therefore appears to preclude the application of pretrial re-
straints to substitute assets.28 
In United States v. Monsanto, 29 the Supreme Court emphasized 
the importance of interpreting forfeiture and restraint provisions 
consistently with their plain language. In Monsanto, the district 
court had entered a restraining order, as provided by section 
853(e)(+)(A) of the CCE, on property the defendant allegedly had 
accumulated in the course of narcotics trafficking.30 The defendant 
moved to vacate the restraining order so that he could use the fro-
zen funds to retain counsel. He argued that the forfeiture provi-
sions of the CCE should be interpreted to include an exemption for 
assets used to pay an attorney. The Court rejected this argument, 
emphasizing that nowhere in the CCE's forfeiture section was there 
any recognition of an exemption for attorney's fees.31 In response 
to contentions that such a ruling ran counter to Congress's intent, 
the Court stressed the plain meaning of the statute and stated that 
"the statute, as presently written, cannot be read any other way."32 
26. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1988). 
27. In full, subsection (m) reads: 
(m) If any of the property described in subsection (a), as a result of any act or omission 
of the defendant -
(1~ cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence; 
(2 has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third party; 
(3 has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court; 
(4) has been substantially diminished in value; or 
(5) has been commingled with other property which cannot be divided without 
difficulty; 
the court shall order the forfeiture of any other property of the defendant up to the 
value of any property described in paragraphs (1) through (5). 
18 U.S.C. § 1963(m) (1988). 
28. See United States v. Floyd, 992 F.2d 498, 502 (5th Cir. 1993). The Floyd court found 
that the statute "plainly states what property may be restrained before trial. Congress made 
specific reference to that property described in§ 853(a) [equivalent to section 1963(a)], and 
that description does not include substitute assets." 992 F.2d at 502. 
29. 491 U.S. 600 (1989). 
30. 491 U.S. at 602-04. 
31. 491 U.S. at 606-14. 
32. 491 U.S. at 614. Although the Monsanto Court reached a strong conclusion with re-
spect to the statutory language's plain meaning, the opinion nevertheless seemed to rely on 
policy grounds as well. The Court remarked that "[p]ermitting a defendant to use assets for 
his private purposes that, under this provision, will become the property of the United States 
if a conviction occurs cannot be sanctioned." 491 U.S. at 613. The Fourth Circuit has pointed 
to this language as providing support for the pretrial restraint of substitute assets. See In re 
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Likewise, section 1963(d)(l) refers only to tainted assets as prop-
erty subject to pretrial restraints, and cannot be read any other way. 
B. Examining the Statute as a Whole 
Examination of the plain meaning of RICO's pretrial restraint 
provision is only the first step in determining its meaning; the stat-
ute must also be read as a whole to provide a context for the plain 
language of section 1963(d).33 RICO's forfeiture provisions, when 
read as a whole, reveal that the statute treats tainted assets and 
substitute assets as two entirely distinct forms of property.34 When 
adding a substitute asset provision to RICO, Congress did not sim-
ply amend section 1963(a) to allow for the forfeiture of any other 
property in the event that the defendant's tainted funds proved un-
available. Although Congress initially considered such an ap-
proach,35 it ultimately decided to add a new subsection detailing 
when substitute assets may be forfeited.36 
Billman, 915 F.2d 916, 921 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom. McKinney v. United States, 
500 U.S. 952 (1991). However, the Billman court's reliance on this language is misplaced. 
Monsanto's statement is merely dictum, and the crux of the Court's reasoning is that the 
statutory language of § 853 does not specifically provide an exemption for attorneys' fees. 
The Monsanto Court discusses policy concerns only as a response to the claim that its reli-
ance on the plain language of the statute produced a result that is contrary to legislative 
intent. 491 U.S. at 610, 613. By observing the strong policy reasons for denying the exclu-
sion, the Court strengthens its contention that the plain language of the statute reveals that 
Congress intended for the restraint of funds which the defendant seeks to use .to retain 
counsel. 
33. The Supreme Court has ruled that "a statute is to be read as a whole ..• since the 
meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends on context." King v. St. Vincent's 
Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991). See also United States v. Schmitz, 153 F.R.D. 136, 140 (E.D. 
Wis. 1994). See generally 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SunmRLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY 
CoNSTRucnoN § 46.05 (5th ed. 1992) ("A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or 
sections and is animated by one general purpose and intent. Consequently, each part or 
section should be construed in connection with every other part or section so as to produce a 
harmonious whole."). 
34. See Graeme W. Bush, The Impact of RICO Forfeiture on Legitimate Business, 65 No-
TRE DAME L. REv. 996, 1007 (1990). Bush criticizes the argument that the substitute asset 
amendment merely clarified already existing powers under § 1963 by pointing out that this 
·notion "disregards the structure of the statute, which distinguishes between the treatment of 
subsection (a) assets and substitute assets under subsection (m)." Id. See also United States 
v. Ripinsky, 20 F.3d 359, 365 n.8 (9th Cir. 1994) (commenting that the statute "distinguishes 
between 'forfeitable' and 'substitute' assets"). 
35. The first time Congress contemplated a substitute asset provision, the proposed 
amendment simply created a clause at the end of subsection (a) which permitted courts to 
reach any other property of the defendant when the tainted assets were unavailable. See S. 
REP. No. 307, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 995 (1981). However, the proposed substitute asset 
amendments of 1982 and 1984 and the ultimately successful enactment in 1986 all refused to 
adopt this approach, instead preferring to add the provision in a distinct subsection. 
36. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m) (1988); see United States v. Floyd, 992 F.2d 498, 502 (5th Cir. 
1993) ("[T]he property described in § 853(a) [equivalent to section 1963(a)] •.• does not 
include substitute assets. Congress treated substitute assets in a different section, § 853(p) 
[equivalent to section 1963(m)]."). 
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Moreover, RICO treats tainted and substitute assets differently, 
taking a far more cautious approach toward substitute assets. 
Whereas tainted assets are automatically forfeitable upon convic-
tion, RICO provides that the substitute asset provision is intended 
as only a last-resort measure. Congress could simply have provided 
for the forfeiture of an amount of money from the defendant's as-
sets equivalent to that involved in the criminal activity, regardless 
of whether the property that would ultimately be forfeited had any 
connection with the offense.37 Instead, the statute directs courts 
first to order the forfeiture of assets that have some nexus with the 
RICO violation.38 Courts may only turn to the substitute asset pro-
vision when some or all of this tainted property is unattainable.39 
Furthermore, even after the prosecution establishes that some 
portion of a defendant's tainted assets is unavailable for forfeiture, 
subsection (m) specifies two additional requirements that must be 
satisfied before courts may order the forfeiture of substitute assets. 
First, one of five conditions precedent must be met. Courts may 
invoke subsection (m)'s substitute asset provision only where the 
tainted property cannot be located by a reasonably diligent 
search,40 is now in the hands of a third party,41 lies beyond the juris-
diction of the court,42 has been substantially diminished in value,43 
or has been commingled with other property such that it cannot be 
separated without difficulty.44 Thus, only certain justifications for 
the failure to reach tainted assets provide adequate grounds for the 
forfeiture of substitute assets. 
Second, subsection (m) also provides that courts may only order 
the forfeiture of substitute assets where an "act or omission of the 
37. Such an approach would not be entirely novel, for the Seventh Circuit appears to 
advocate a similar theory in United States v. Ginsburg, 773 F.2d 798 (7th Cir. 1985). Gins-
burg involved a RICO prosecution before the 1986 enactment of a substitute asset provision. 
The defendant argued that the United States' interest in forfeiture was limited to the amount 
that the defendant still had in his possession upon conviction or that the government bore the 
burden of proving that the assets sought for forfeiture were the same as those obtained in 
violation of RICO. 773 F.2d at 801. The Seventh Circuit rejected these arguments, advanc-
ing the following theory: 
What the defendant's argument overlooks is the fact that a racketeer who dissipates the 
profits or proceeds of his racketeering activity on wine, women, and song has profited 
from organized crime to the same extent as if he had put the money in his bank account. 
Every dollar that the racketeer derives from illicit activities and then spends on such 
items as food, entertainment, college tuition, and charity, is a dollar that should not have 
been available for him to spend for those purposes. 
773 F.2d at 802. 
38. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m) (1988). 
39. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m) (1988). 
40. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m)(l) (1988). 
41. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m)(2) (1988). 
42. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m)(3) (1988). 
43. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m)(4) (1988). 
44. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m)(5) (1988). 
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defendant" makes the tainted property unavailable.45 This "act or 
omission" requirement presumably indicates that the defendant 
must have been a proximate cause of the unavailability of the as-
sets.46 By contrast, the forfeiture of tainted assets is automatic 
upon conviction. This limitation of RICO's substitute asset provi-
sion is quite significant when one recognizes that the defendant has 
already been convicted at this point in the process, and thus there is 
no need for the more cautious treatment that is ordinarily accorded 
to those merely accused of a crime.47 Consider, for example, the 
defendant who is convicted of a RICO offense and owns a house 
that is deemed to be tainted under section 1963(a). If a sudden 
catastrophe completely destroys this property, and the defendant 
was unable to purchase insurance for such an event, the govern-
ment cannot tum to RICO's substitute asset provision as a means 
of compensating for this loss. Even though the defendant has been 
found guilty of a racketeering crime, Congress would prefer that 
the government be unable to collect the full amount owed to it, 
rather than force the defendant to make up the difference out of 
untainted funds. 
The distinction RICO makes between substitute and tainted as-
sets demonstrates that the tainted asset provision should not be 
read as implicitly referring to the substitute asset provision. In 
United States v. Schmitz, 48 however, the magistrate judge criticized 
other courts that began with the initial assumption that subsection 
(a) does not include substitute property.49 Instead, the court in 
Schmitz reasoned that the substitute asset provision was designed 
to supplement subsection (a).50 The court attributed subsection 
' 
45. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m) (1988). 
46. Of course, the "act or omission" requirement could be read so broadly that it would 
almost always be satisfied. For instance, if tainted assets in the possession of a defendant 
were stolen by a third party, one might argue that the defendant "omitted" to protect ade-
quately the property from theft and that therefore the government should be permitted to 
seize substitute assets. 
Such a broad reading, however, would render meaningless Congress's restriction on the 
forfeiture of substitute assets to situations where tainted assets are unavailable due to an "act 
or omission" of the defendant, because courts could always trace the unavailability to some 
act or omission of the defendant. Given that Congress presumably had good reason for in-
cluding this restriction, courts should not nullify it by interpreting it too broadly. 
47. See infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text (discussing the presumption of inno-
cence and its impact on preconviction proceedings). 
48. 153 F.R.D. 136 (E.D. Wis. 1994). 
49. Schmitz cites In re Martin, 1 F.3d 1351 (3d. Cir. 1993} and United States v. Floyd, 992 
F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1993) as presuming that the tainted asset provision does not include substi-
tute assets. 153 F.R.D. at 139. In fact, in Floyd, the government was willing to stipulate that 
subsection (a) does not also contain substitute assets. 992 F.2d at 501. 
50. 153 F.R.D. at 139. The court actually reasoned that the substitute asset provision was 
designed to "supplant" the tainted asset provision. Given that both subsections still exist, 
subsection (m) clearly did not wholly replace subsection (a); hence, the court's use of "sup-
plant" probably should not be read literally. It makes sense, therefore, to read Schmitz as 
arguing that subsection (m) supplemented subsection (a). 
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(a)'s failure to mention substitute property to chronology, noting 
that subsection (a) was enacted years before the addition of a sub-
stitute asset provision.s1 The court concluded that because subsec-
tion (m) was intended to supplement subsection (a), any reference 
to subsection (a) property necessarily includes substitute assets as 
well. 
The Schmitz court's argument fails because RICO treats substi-
tute and tainted assets as two entirely separate forms of property. 
Nowhere in RICO's forfeiture provisions is there evidence that 
Congress intended the substitute asset measure to supplement the 
tainted asset subsection. If Congress had designed the 1986 substi-
tute asset amendment to supplement the tainted asset provision, as 
Schmitz suggests, it could have simply amended subsection (a) to 
provide for a substitute asset clause, as discussed above.s2 In the 
alternative, Congress could easily have added language to the sub-
stitute asset provision stating that it incorporates subsection (a) by 
reference. Instead, Congress drafted. RICO's forfeiture provisions 
keeping substitute assets distinct from tainted assets, and the statute 
treats the two forms of assets differently. 
In purporting to read RICO in its entirety, the court also found 
that one of RICO's purposes is to preserve all forfeitable assets and 
therefore concluded that the pretrial restraint provision must im-
plicitly include substitute assets. The court reasoned that this pres-
ervation purpose authorized the pretrial restraint of substitute 
assets, because "[t]o conclude otherwise would eviscerate the intent 
of the criminal forfeiture statute."S3 The Fourth Circuit apparently 
reached a similar conclusion in In re Billman. s4 In Billman, the 
court emphasized that the purpose of RICO's pretrial restraint 
measure is the preservation of assets that may ultimately be for-
feited upon conviction.ss Much like the court in Schmitz, the 
Fourth Circuit concluded that it must read RICO's pretrial restraint 
provision as implicitly referring to substitute assets so that "the pur-
pose of§ 1963(d)(l)(A) can be attained."S6 
Th.is attempt to read a preservation purpose into RICO's forfei-
ture provisions in order to permit courts to enter pretrial restraints 
against substitute assets cannot overcome the statute's plain lan-
guage and structure. They reveal an intent to preserve the availa-
bility of certain assets for ultimate forfeiture upon conviction. Yet, 
51. 153 F.R.D. at 139. 
52. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text. 
53. 153 F.R.D. at 140. 
54. 915 F.2d 916 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom. McKinney v. United States, 500 
U.S. 952 (1991). 
55. 915 F.2d at 921. 
56. 915 F.2d at 921. 
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as the language of subsection {d){l) makes clear, this preservation 
intent extends only to tainted assets.57 
Moreover, even if it were sensible to read the purpose of section 
1963 as preserving all forms of assets for ultimate forfeiture, such a 
reading would not authorize courts to allow for the pretrial restraint 
of substitute assets. The Court's decision in United States v. Mon-
santo58 indicates that the plain language of RICO, which limits the 
pretrial restraint provision to tainted assets, should prevail over this 
perceived purpose of preservation. The Court answered the criti-
cism that its ruling runs counter to the intent of the statute by as-
serting that "the statute, as presently written, cannot be read any 
other way."59 The Court noted that Congress could always amend 
the statute so that its plain language would conform to its intended 
purposes.60 Likewise, section 1963 can only be read as precluding 
the pretrial restraint of substitute assets. If Congress believes that 
this reading frustrates a purpose of preservation, it can amend 
RICO to provide explicitly for the pretrial restraint of substitute 
assets. 
C. The Relevance of RICO's Liberal Construction Mandate 
The bill enacting RICO into law stipulated that its forfeiture 
provisions were to be "liberally construed to effectuate its remedial 
purposes,"61 and the Supreme Court has agreed that RICO should 
be interpreted in this fashion.62 Several courts have relied upon 
this liberal construction mandate in interpreting section 1963 as 
permitting the pretrial restraint of substitute assets.63 
57. 18 u.s.c. § 1963(d)(l) (1988). 
58. 491 U.S. 600 (1989); see supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text. 
59. 491 U.S. at 614. 
60. 491 U.S. at 614. For a recent example of a court's emphasizing the plain meaning in 
the face of possible policy concerns to the contrary, see In re Moffitt, Zwerling & Kemler, 864 
F. Supp. 527, 534-35 (E.D. Va. 1994). At issue in Moffitt was whether the court could require 
a law firm that had received and spent potentially forfeitable money from a defendant, to 
forfeit a sum equal to the amount originally subject to forfeiture. The court acknowledged 
that "[t]here is a visceral tendency to give a quick affirmative answer to this question ••• 
[and] conclude that the Law Firm should be required to pay it back from the Firm's other 
assets." 864 F. Supp. at 534-35. Yet the Moffitt court declined to follow this "visceral ten-
dency," reflecting that "[i]f the power is not found in the statute, a court should avoid creat-
ing one by implication on policy grounds." 864 F. Supp. at 535. The court feared that by 
giving in to this temptation to amend the statute to conform with notions of policy, it would 
cross the "line that exists between principled but energetic judicial lawmaking and illegiti-
mate usurpation of the legislative role." 864 F. Supp. at 535. 
61. Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947 (1970). 
62. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S: 16, 27 (1983) (quoting Pub. L. No. 91-452 
§ 904(a), 84 Stat. 947 (1970)). § 853(0) of the CCE provides an identical liberal construction 
clause. 21 U.S.C. § 853(0) {1988).' 
63. See, e.g., In re Billman, 915 F.2d 916, 921 {4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom. McKin-
ney v. United States, 500 U.S. 952 (1991); United States v. O'Brien, 836 F. Supp. 438, 441 
(S.D. Ohio 1993); United States v. Wu, 814 F. Supp. 491, 493 (E.D. Va. 1993). The Fourth 
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These courts, however, have misunderstood the scope of that 
mandate. It merely requires courts to resolve any ambiguity in the 
forfeiture clause such that the remedial goals of the statute are 
served.64 The mandate does not permit courts to amend the statute 
by judicial interpretation.65 The Supreme Court recently acknowl-
edged these limits on the liberal construction mandate, ruling that 
"[t]his [liberal construction] clause obviously seeks to ensure that 
Congress' intent is not frustrated by an overly narrow reading of 
the statute, but it is not an invitation to apply RICO to new pur-
poses that Congress never intended. "66 
As discussed in section I.A, the language of section 1963( d)(l) is 
unambiguous; accordingly, courts need not even consider the liberal 
construction mandate. Construing the pretrial restraint measures 
of section 1963(d) as only applying to subsection (a) property be-
cause the section only refers to that property does not amount to 
the "overly narrow reading of the statute" that the liberal construc-
tion mandate was intended to avert. Moreover, interpreting section 
1963(a), which only mentions tainted assets, as not including substi-
tute assets is reasonable, given that RICO treats tainted assets and 
substitute assets very differently.67 Therefore, courts should not use 
Circuit, for example, stressed that RICO's remedial purpose requires the preservation of 
defendant's assets for forfeiture if he is convicted. In re Billman, 915 F.2d at 921. The 
Billman court then simply concluded that given this remedial purpose, it could read RICO's 
pretrial restraint provision as implicitly referring to substitute assets as well. 915 F.2d at 921. 
This reasoning is similar to, but distinct from, the Billman court's assertion that the preserva-
tion purpose of § 1963( d) requires it to read an implicit reference to substitute assets into 
RICO's pretrial restraint provision. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text. The 
Billman court first indicated that this preservation purpose alone allows for the pretrial re-
straint of substitute assets. 915 F.2d at 921. The court then supported this conclusion by 
pointing to the liberal construction mandate as additional authorization for the entry of pre-
trial restraining orders against substitute property. 915 F.2d at 921. 
64. The Supreme Court has commented that RICO's liberal construction clause " 'only 
serves as an aid for resolving ambiguity; it is not to be used to beget one.'" Reves v. Ernst & 
Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163, 1172 (1993) (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 492 
n.10 (1985)); see also G. Robert Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections 
on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 237, 290 n.150 (1982) ("[I]f RICO's language is 
plain, it ought to control; if the language is ambiguous, that construction which would 'effec-
tuate its remedial purposes' ..• ought to be adopted."); Craig W. Palm, Note, RICO and the 
Liberal Construction Clause, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 167, 191 (1980) (concluding that "words 
should be given their plain meaning whenever possible" and that the liberal construction 
directive is only intended to guide courts when dealing with ambiguities). See generally Alan 
R. Romero, Note, Interpretive Directions in Statutes, 31 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 211, 239 ("Even 
though interpretive directions may not say so explicitly, they generally operate only to re-
solve ambiguities in a statute."). 
65. See United States v. Floyd, 992 F.2d 498, 502 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting that "this com-
mand for a liberal construction does not authorize us to amend by interpretation"). 
66. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. at 1172. In Ernst & Young, the Court refused to extend 
liability under § 1962( c) of RICO because it read the language and legislative history as indi-
cating that Congress intended to limit liability to those individuals who participate in the 
operation or management of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering. 113 S. Ct. at 
1172. 
67. See supra notes 34-47 and accompanying text. 
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the liberal construction mandate to extend RICO's forfeiture pow-
ers to allow for the pretrial restraint of substitute assets - a "new 
purpose[ ] that Congress never intended. "68 
II. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 1963 
This Part examines the legislative history of RICO's forfeiture 
provisions to determine whether there is any clearly expressed leg-
islative intent that would permit the pretrial restraint of substitute 
assets. Although the substitute asset provision was enacted in 1986 
without any accompanying legislative history, Congress considered 
adding virtually identical substitute asset provisions to RICO in 
1982 and 1984, and useful legislative history accompanies both of 
these attempts.69 Section II.A examines the legislative record be-
hind the 1982 effort to add a substitute asset provision and identi-
fies language plainly indicating that the pretrial restraint measures 
of RICO were not intended to cover substitute assets. Section II.B 
then looks at the 1984 attempt and explains that Congress amended 
RICO's pretrial restraint provision with the expectation that there 
would be a substitute asset measure as well. Given this expectation, 
the 1984 change from nonspecific to very specific language in 
RICO's pretrial restraint provision offers additional evidence that 
Congress did not plan for the pretrial restraint of substitute assets. 
This Part concludes that the legislative history offers no indication 
of any congressional intent that would justify ignoring the plain lan-
guage of section 1963. In fact, the record surrounding Congress's 
previous efforts to add a substitute asset provision indicates that 
Congress specifically intended to limit RICO's pretrial restraint 
measures to tainted property. 
A. The 1982 Legislative History 
Congress considered a series of substantial amendments to 
RICO in 1982. Included among these proposed amendments was a 
substitute asset provision as well as the modification of RICO's pre-
trial restraint provision that passed two years later.70 The accompa-
nying committee report explicitly declares that the pretrial restraint 
amendment would apply only to tainted assets - assets that were 
then described in subsection (a)(2). The report states: "It should 
also be noted that the restraining order provision applies only to 
(a)(2) property. It may not be applied with respect to other assets 
68. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. at 1172. See infra Part II (concluding that the legislative 
history suggests that Congress did pot intend for the pretrial restraint of substitute assets). 
69. Congress also considered a substitute asset amendment in 1981, but the scant legisla-
tive history accompanying this attempt does not shed any light on Congress's views regarding 
the pretrial restraint of substitute assets. See S. REP. No. 307, supra note 35, at 993-96. 
70. See S. REP. No. 520, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). 
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that may ultimately be ordered forfeited under the substitute asset 
provision."71 This statement evinces a clear legislative mandate 
that section 1963's pretrial restraint measures should not extend to 
substitute assets.12 
This mandate, of course, is found Within legislative history for a 
bill that Congress did not pass.73 But according to the Supreme 
Court, the legislative history of a previous unenacted bill is "wholly 
relevant" to an understanding of a later-enacted bill where the lan-
guage of the two acts is substantially the same.74 Here, the pretrial 
restraint and substitute asset provisions considered in 1982 are es-
sentially identical to the measures that eventually passed into law.75 
71. Id. at 10 n.18. One court has attempted to discredit this legislative history by noting 
that the Senate Report states that RICO's pretrial restraint measures apply only to subsec-
tion (a)(2) property, whereas the present provision applies to subsection (a) property. See 
United States v. Schmitz, 153 F.R.D. 136, 139-40 (E.D. WIS. 1994). This distinction is imma-
terial. In the amendments to§ 1963 considered in 1982, subsection (a)(2) encompassed al-
most exactly the same assets that subsection (a) does today. The present version of 
subsection (a) describes which forms of property are considered "tainted" and thus forfeita-
ble upon conviction. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1988). The 1982 version was structured some-
what differently. Subsection (a) was divided into two parts. Subsection (a)(l) set forth the 
other possible sanctions that may result from a RICO conviction, and subsection (a)(2) es-
tablished what constituted "tainted" assets. See S. REP. No. 520, supra note 70, at 23. Thus, 
the Senate Report referred to subsection (a)(2), instead of subsection (a), simply because at 
that time subsection (a) was formatted in a slightly different fashion. 
72. Both the Third and Nmth Circuits have concluded that this statement unequivocally 
establishes that Congress did not iiltend for the pretrial restraint of substitute assets. See 
United States v. Ripinsky, 20 F.3d 359, 363-64 {9th Cir. 1994); In re Martin, 1 F.3d 1351, 
1359-60 {3d Cir. 1993). 
73. See Schmitz, 153 F.R.D. at 140. In attempting to discredit reliance on the 1982 report, 
the Schmitz magistrate asserted that the war against crime had escalated in the years follow-
ing 1982 and concluded that "[i]t is therefore difficult to say that Congress's reasons, con-
cerns and intentions at the time the substitute asset provision was enacted were the same as 
in 1982, when Congress declined to enact the provision." 153 F.R.D. at 140. 
74. See United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 404-06 (1973). In discussing the legisla-
tive history surrounding the Hobbs Act, the Emnons Court relied upon a statement made by 
Congressman Hobbs in introducing an earlier version of the bill that had only passed in the 
House of Representatives. The Court stressed that the earlier history was applicable because 
"the operative language of the original bill was substantially carried forward into the Act." 
410 U.S. at 404 n.14. 
75. The 1982 version of the substitute asset provision read in full: 
(d) If any of the property described in subsection {a)(2) -
{l) cannot be located; 
(2) has been transferred to, sold to, or deposited with, a third party, 
(3) has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court, 
( 4) has been substantially diminished in value by any act or omission of the defend-
ant, or 
(5) has been commingled with other property which cannot be divided without 
difficulty, . 
the court shall order the forfeiture of any other property of the defendant up to the 
value of any property described in paragraphs (1) through (5). 
S. REP. No. 520, supra note 70 at 24. The present version of RICO's substitute asset provi-
sion is quoted in full supra in note 27. A comparison of the two provisions reveals that they 
are essentially the same, with only two significant differences. First, the current version adds 
a due diligence requirement for property that "cannot be located" under subsection {l). Sec-
ond, the 1982 amendment specifies in subsection (4) that the property must be diminished in 
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Accordingly, the 1982 committee report's statement regarding the 
limits of RICO's pretrial restraint measure offers strong evidence 
that Congress never intended for section 1963's restraints to apply 
to substitute assets.76 
B. The 1984 Legislative History 
In the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act (CFA) of 1984,77 Congress 
reconsidered many of the amendments to RICO that were pro-
posed in 1982 but never enacted.78 This time Congress succeeded 
in substantially revising RICO's forfeiture provisions. For instance, 
Congress greatly expanded the scope of RICO's pretrial restraint 
provisions by permitting courts to enter preindictment restraining 
orders.79 The CFA also included a substitute asset provision, but 
the provision was ultimately eliminated in a different section of the 
same act without any explanation in the legislative history.so 
value "by any act or omission of the defendant." In the final version, this requirement ap-
plies to all of subsection (m). 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m) (1988). 
76. The magistrate judge in Schmitz also raised one other rather peculiar argument in 
endeavoring to discredit this statement in the 1982 report. The magistrate noted that this 
statement falls within a section of text that seems especially concerned with the constitutional 
implications of prior restraint measures. 153 F.R.D. at 140. This observation, however, does 
not detract from the statement's relevance as pertinent legislative history. First, the court is 
probably incorrect in its reading of this supposed context. Schmitz cites pages nine and ten of 
the committee report as manifesting a particular sensitivity to constitutional issues. 153 
F.R.D. at 140 (citing S. REP. No. 520, supra note 70, at 9-10). Yet on these two pages, the 
only conceivable indication of a constitutional concern is that the report devotes a footnote 
to listing several cases that consider whether a restraining order is incompatible with the 
presumption of innocence. See S. REP. No. 520, supra note 70, at 10 n.19. The report does 
not appear to be especially concerned with the implications of this issue, for it subsequently 
expresses the view that "pretrial restraining orders for the purpose of preserving assets does 
not impinge on the trial concept of a presumption of innocence." Id. at 11. 
Furthermore, even if one does read the surrounding text of the committee report as 
somehow revealing a concern with the constitutional reach of pretrial restraint measures, 
such an interpretation does not diminish the value of the statement as pertinent legislative 
history. It is difficult to understand the relevance of this supposed context. Schmitz seems to 
be advancing this alleged sensitivity to explain why the committee report explicitly limits the 
application of pretrial restraints to tainted property. However, the underlying motivation ls 
of little concern here, for such a motivation cannot diminish the strength of a statement 
which plainly asserts that RICO's pretrial restraint measures do not apply to substitute as-
sets. It does not matter why Congress decided to restrict RICO's restraint powers to tainted 
assets; all that is important is that the legislature, for whatever reason, did not intend for 
§ 1963( d) to apply to substitute assets. 
77. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2040. 
78. See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text (discussing the CFA). 
79. This revision of RICO's pretrial restraint powers can now be found, essentially un-
changed, at 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d) (1988). 
80. The substitute asset provision was added in chapter three of the 1984 Act by § 302 of 
the CFA. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2040. In the same Act, however,§ 230l(b) of chapter 
23 further amended RICO by striking out the previously added substitute asset provision. 
Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2192. The legislative history accompanying the 1984 Act dis-
cusses the substitute asset provision as if it were ultimately enacted and offers no explanation 
for why it was eventually withdrawn. No other source has been able to explain why this 
subsection was withdrawn. The Seventh Circuit has commented that "[t]he reason for the 
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That Congress considered a substitute asset provision at the 
same time it substantially revised RICO's pretrial restraint meas-
ures suggests that Congress drafted the present-day version of 
RICO's pretrial restraint provision with the expectation that RICO 
would also include a substitute asset provision. This expectation 
affects the interpretation of the legislative history in two ways. 
First, it answers the argument that section 1963(d)(l) does not 
refer to substitute assets because RICO had no substitute asset pro-
vision at the time section 1963(d)(l) was enacted.Bl This argument 
proves meritless because Congress drafted the pretrial restraint 
amendment under the assumption that a substitute asset provision 
would exist as well. In fact, section 1963(d)(l)'s explicit reference 
only to tainted property, at a time when Congress presumed the 
existence of a substitute asset measure, supports the argument that 
Congress did not intend for the pretrial restraint of substitute 
assets. 
Second, the presumption of a coexisting substitute asset provi-
sion is also of particular significance when one compares the 
amended version of RICO's pretrial restraint provision with the 
original enactment. Although the revised pretrial restraint provi-
sion specifies which type of assets may be restrained, the earlier 
version merely stated that courts could enter restraints "in connec-
tion with any property or other interest subject to forfeiture under 
this section."82 Tainted assets were the only form of property sub-
ject to forfeiture when Congress drafted the original restraining or-
der provision, so there was no need to specify which assets could be 
restrained. But Congress amended the pretrial restraint provision 
in 1984 with the assumption that there would now be two categories 
of forfeitable assets - substitute and tainted - thus creating the 
need to identify which type of property was covered. Accordingly, 
Congress's decision to change the wording of RICO's pretrial re-
straint provision from "any property or other interest subject to for-
feiture" to "property described in subsection (a)" at the same time 
last-minute deletion of what would have been [the substitute asset provision] is unclear." 
United States v. Ginsburg, 773 F.2d 798, 801 n.2 (7th Cir. 1985). One congressman, in advo-
cating passage of the substitute asset measure in 1986, noted that the provision was "part of 
the Comprehensive Crime Control Act when it left this House several years ago and similarly 
was passed in the other body. Somehow it got dropped out in conference." 132 CoNG. REc. 
22,962 (1986) (statement of Rep. Lungren). 
81. No court has raised this specific argument. But cf. United States v. Schmitz, 153 
F.R.D. 136, 139-40 (E.D. Wis. 1994). The court in Schmitz raises a similar chronological 
argument in concluding that the substitute asset provision was meant to supplement the 
tainted asset provision. The opinion uses the fact that substitute assets were added to § 853 
well after the tainted asset provision to explain why the tainted asset provision does not 
specifically refer to substitute assets. 153 F.R.D. at 139; see supra note 51 and accompanying 
text. 
82. Pub. L No. 91-452, 84 Stat 922, 1098 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d) 
(1988)). 
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that it created another form of property hardly seems coincidental. 
This change from nonspecific language to very specific language ap-
pears to indicate a conscious choice by Congress to limit RICO's 
pretrial restraint measures to tainted funds. 
ill. CONGRESSIONAL REASONS FOR TREATING SUBSTITUTE 
ASSETS DIFFERENTLY FROM TAINTED ASSETS 
Although the plain statutory language and legislative history of 
section 1963 make it clear that Congress did not intend for courts to 
apply RICO's pretrial restraint measures to substitute assets, at first 
blush, this conclusion seems at odds with RICO's particularly ex-
pansive nature. RICO is renowned for its extremely broad applica-
tion and potentially severe penalties. The Seventh Circuit has 
described RICO as a "statute of exceedingly broad scope,"83 and 
the Supreme Court has agreed that RICO was "intended to provide 
new weapons of unprecedented scope for an assault upon organized 
crime and its economic roots."84 A recognition of RICO's breadth 
seems to motivate those courts that permit the pretrial restraint of 
substitute assets. Implicit in these various courts' opinions is a fail-
ure to understand why Congress, which historically has worked to 
expand RICO to an unprecedented scope, would balk at the notion 
of the pretrial restraint of substitute assets.ss 
This Part addresses this confusion and explains why it makes 
sense for RICO to limit section 1963's pretrial restraint measures to 
tainted property. It argues that the greater care that is required for 
pretrial impositions on assets unconnected with the illegal activity 
justifies the differential treatment RICO gives to substitute assets.86 
83. United States v. Ginsburg, 773 F.2d 798, 802 (7th Cir. 1985). 
84. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 26 (1983); see also Palm, supra note 2, at 27 
("The most striking aspect of RICO's forfeiture provisions is their unprecedented nature and 
breadth."). · 
85. Professor Palm has observed that this sensitivity to RICO's broad application does 
affect judicial reasoning at times. He notes that the expansive language ofRICO's forfeiture 
provisions has sometimes prompted courts to conclude summarily that certain assets.are for-
feitable or to ignore whether the forfeiture sought by the prosecution is permitted by any 
specific language of § 1963. Palm, supra note 2, at 27-28. 
86. But see King, supra note 2. King argues that Congress should amend RICO to pro-
vide explicitly for the pretrial restraint of substitute assets. King, supra note 2, at 269. He 
sees two justifications for the imposition of§ 1963{d) restraints on substitute property. He 
asserts that the pretrial restraint of substitute assets would preserve the availability of such 
assets for postconviction forfeiture proceedings and would firmly establish the proper court's 
jurisdiction over the potentially forfeitable property. Id. at 271-72. 
Although King advocates allowing the pretrial restraint of substitute assets, his argument 
nonetheless lends support to the notion that there are reasons to limit pretrial restraint pow-
ers to tainted property. King acknowledges that the imposition of pretrial restraints on sub-
stitute assets could potentially impair the accused's ability to provide for basic living 
expenses. Id. at 287-88; see infra notes 94-97 and accompanying text (commenting further on 
the potential hardships associated with pretrial restraining orders). In fact, he argues that in 
amending RICO to allow for the pretrial restraint of substitute assets, Congress should also 
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Section ID.A first notes that Congress expressed greater concern 
for defendants' rights at preconviction stages of the trial process. It 
then argues that not allowing pretrial restraint of substitute assets is 
consistent with RICO's heightened protection of defendants' rights 
at the pretrial stage. Section m.B maintains that defendants de-
serve less protection for their tainted assets because they are not 
legally entitled to such ill-gotten gains. Substitute assets, on the 
other hand, lack a nexus with the illegal conduct, and thus Congress 
had good reason to exercise caution when drafting legislation that 
permits the government to restrain substitute assets. This Part con-
cludes that in light of the strict safeguards that Congress imposed 
on preconviction proceedings, it is not surprising that the legislature 
would refuse to extend RICO's pretrial restraint measures to sub-
stitute assets.87 
A. The Importance of Timing in Section 1963: Pre- and 
Postconviction Proceedings 
The level of procedural protection defendants receive in 
RICO's forfeiture proceedings depends in large measure on the 
phase of the prosecution in which they fall.BB This disparate treat-
ment of a defendant's assets depending on the phase of the prose-
cution makes a great deal of sense. It remains a fundamental tenet 
of our criminal justice system that the accused is presumed innocent 
add a specific description of the hearing process to be used when the government seeks the 
extension of restraints on substitute assets beyond the mere ten-day temporary restraint or-
der set forth in§ 1963(d)(2). King, supra note 2, at 283-86; see infra notes 99-100 and ac-
companying text (describing the hearing procedure for§ 1963(d)(2) restraints). King calls 
for a formalized hearing process because he perceives an inherent potential for abuse in the 
pretrial restraint of substitute assets. In addition to affording the court an opportunity to 
make allowances for basic living expenses, the hearing is also intended to provide a check 
against abuses by the prosecution. King argues that the hearing should ensure that tainted 
assets are actually unavailable and that the prosecution has not overstated the value of such 
tainted assets or understated the value of the restrained substitute property. King, supra 
note 2, at 285-86. 
'ir/. The plain language of § 1963, as discussed in Part I, and the relevant legislative his-
tory, as discussed in Part II, indicate that RICO does not provide for the pretrial restraint of 
substitute assets. Although Congress has made it clear that RICO's pretrial restraint meas-
ures are not designed to cover substitute assets, it has never explained the reason for this 
result. This Part attempts to fill this void by offering a possible reason. Even if one rejects 
the explanation offered in this Part, it does not follow that RICO must then provide for the 
pretrial restraint of substitute assets. This Note's conclusion that RICO's pretrial restraint 
measures do not apply to substitute assets stands firmly on the plain language and legislative 
history alone; Part III merely endeavors to explain why this conclusion makes sense. 
88. See Palm, supra note 2, at 19 ("The mechanisms and attendant procedures [of 
§ 1963(d)] vary depending upon when in the criminal process the government seeks relief."); 
Michael L. Sheier, Comment, The Bill of Rights Becomes the Latest Casualty in the War on 
Drugs and Organized Crime - Surprisingly, Forfeiture of Attorney Fees is Consistent with the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution, 59 U. CIN. L. REv. 905, 936 
(1991) (interpreting the structure of§ 853 as indicating that "Congress contemplated that the 
role and power of the court would change depending on the juncture in the forfeiture 
proceeding"). 
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until the trier of fact finds guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.89 Of 
course, this presumption of innocence does not bar the imposition 
of all forms of restraint on the accused or the accused's property 
before a conviction. Courts may, for instance, deny bail where the 
defendant is deemed to present a serious threat to the safety of the 
community.90 But the presumption of innocence does at least indi-
cate that the interests of the accused should merit special considera-
tion before guilt is determined. 
Moreover, the risk of erroneous deprivation of the defendant's 
property is far greater in the early stages of a prosecution. By the 
time of conviction, the defendant has had a full opportunity to 
make use of the truth-finding abilities of the adversarial process. 
At earlier stages, the defendant has not yet had this full opportu-
nity, and thus the potential for error is much more significant. This 
risk is particularly real for the several preconviction proceedings, 
such as the imposition of section 1963( d)(2) restraints, that are con-
ducted ex parte.91 For example, in Martin, the government initially 
sought the imposition of pretrial restraints on well over fifteen mil-
lion dollars, but a subsequent indictment alleged that only six 
million dollars were tainted.92 Martin demonstrates the kind of 
mistakes the government can make in the early stages of a 
prosecution. 93 
The presumption of innocence and the potential for error re-
quire that courts exercise caution in imposing on a defendant's as-
sets in pretrial settings, especially because restraining orders are 
such powerful weapons.94 Several courts have recognized that the 
entry of pretrial restraints may impose great hardship on the ac-
cused.95 Restraining orders can deny a defendant access to most or 
even all of his assets, and he may require the use of at least a por-
89. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the importance of the presumption of 
innocence doctrine. See, e.g., Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976} {"The presumption 
of innocence .•. is a basic component of a fair trial under our system of criminal justice."); 
Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 {1895) {"The principle that there is a presumption 
of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its 
enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law."). 
90. See United States v. Salemo, 481 U.S. 739 {1987) (upholding the Bail Reform Act of 
1984's preventive detention measures against constitutional challenge). 
91. One commentator has noted that in a nonadversarial ex parte proceeding, "there is a 
substantial risk that the order will erroneously deprive a defendant of his property interests." 
King, supra note 2, at 279; cf. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 
492, 501 {1993) {"The practice of ex parte seizure ••. creates an unacceptable risk of error."). 
92. 1 F.3d 1351, 1354-55 {3d Cir. 1993). The facts of Martin are summarized supra note 
14. 
93. 1 F.3d at 1354-55. 
94. See United States v. Ripinsky, 20 F.3d 359, 365 {9th Cir. 1994) (describing the CCE's 
pretrial restraint measures as a "drastic remedy"). 
95. See, e.g., United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905, 928 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. 
Thier, 801F.2d1463, 1476 {5th Cir. 1986) (Rubin J., concurring); see also King, supra note 2 
at 288 ("A complete pretrial restraint on the means needed to pay ordinary living expenses 
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tion of them to provide for the basic necessities of life. Moreover, 
pretrial restraints may a1so impose hardships on those individuals 
who are :financially dependant on the accused.96 For instance, a 
widower with several dependent young children, if subjected to sec-
tion 1963( d) restraints, might suddenly lack the funds to provide his 
children with clothes, food, and medical care.97 
The need for greater caution in restraining assets in the early 
stages of a prosecution is expressed in RICO's forfeiture section, 
for that provision's approach toward a defendant's assets turns on 
the phase of the prosecution. In preindictment proceedings, RICO 
provides the strongest measures for safeguarding the rights of the 
defendant. Courts must satisfy several strict requirements before 
entering any form of restraint against potentially forfeitable prop-
erty.98 If notice to the interested parties and an opportunity for a 
hearing are not provided, the court may only impose a temporary 
restraining order with a time limit of up to ten days.99 Moreover, 
irreparably imposes the economic impact of forfeiture on the defendant and his dependents 
before a trial and conviction have occurred."). 
These potential burdens are exacerbated when RICO's pretrial restraint provision is ap-
plied to substitute assets. When § 1963( d) restraints are imposed on tainted assets, there is at 
least the strong possibility that the defendant and any dependents will be able to rely on 
some other form of untainted property to provide for the basic necessities of life. When 
courts extend these restraints to all forms of assets, however, the probability that a defendant 
will be unable to reach enough of his assets to pay for basic living expenses naturally in-
creases. See Ripinsky, 20 F.3d at 365 (describing the CCE's pretrial restraint measures as a 
"drastic remedy," and remarking that to extend subsection {d)'s restraint powers to substi-
tute assets would be "an even more powerful weapon"). 
96. The defendant facing a RICO prosecution usually has the option to waive bail and 
remain in jail, where he will be at least assured of receiving food and shelter. His depen-
dents, however, do not have such an option. 
97. Judge Alvin Rubin has described the hardships that may result from the imposition of 
pretrial restraining orders. See Thier, 801 F.2d at 1476. In Thier, the defendant challenged 
the imposition of a restraining order on several grounds, one of which was the district court's 
failure to exempt some assets from restraint so that he could provide for his basic living 
expenses. 801 F.2d at 1466. The F1fth Circuit agreed that the trial court should at least have 
considered the defendant's need for living expenses. 801 F.2d at 1471. Concurring in the 
result, Judge Rubin filed a separate opinion in which he emphasized the potential hardships 
that might be imposed by the entry of a restraining order. He noted that if the defendant 
"has no money to buy food or to pay for housing, he might waive his right to release on bail 
and go to jail, but ... his family would remain stripped of all means of support - without the 
option of reporting to jail - though accused of no crime." 801 F.2d at 1476. To Judge 
Rubin, this potential result "should shock the judicial conscience at least as much as does the 
assertion that the prosecution may pump the stomach of an accused person in order to obtain 
evidence." 801 F.2d at 1476. 
Furthermore, because RICO's pretrial restraint provision allows for the entry of re-
straining orders before an indictment, the accused might not even be arrested yet, and thus 
not have the option to remain in jail. Of course, preindictment restraining orders are subject 
to stringent time limits. See infra notes 99, 105, and accompanying text. Still, the defendant's 
inability to use his assets for even a brief period of time may impair his ability to provide for 
certain basic necessities. 
98. 18 u.s.c. § 1963{d) {1988). 
99. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(2) (1988). This ten-day limit may be extended if good cause is 
shown or the affected party consents to further restraints. 18 U.S.C. § 1963{d)(2) (1988). 
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the prosecution must show that there is probable cause to believe 
that the disputed property would be subject to forfeiture in the 
event of a conviction and that notifying the defendant would "jeop-
ardize the availability of the property for forfeiture."100 
If the prosecution desires some action more substantial than a 
ten-day temporary restraining order but has not yet filed an indict-
ment or information, it must satisfy an even stricter test. First, no-
tice and an opportunity for a hearing must be provided to the 
parties appearing to have an interest in the disputed property.101 
Second, the prosecution must establish that there is a "substantial 
probability" that the assets would be forfeited and that the failure 
to impose restraints immediately would result in the assets being 
made unavailable for forfeiture.102 Third, the court must determine 
that the need to preserve the availability of the property outweighs 
any hardship on the parties subject to the restraint.103 When these 
three requirements are met, a court may enter a restraining order 
or injunction, require a performance bond, or take any other action 
to preserve the assets.104 Yet even these more substantial actions 
are limited in duration, for courts may only impose preindictment 
restraining orders for up to ninety days. ms 
Once the prosecution has filed an indictment or information 
charging the defendant with a RICO violation, these stringent re-
quirements and limitations are lifted.106 The prosecution no longer 
needs to demonstrate that there is a substantial probability of ulti-
mate forfeiture and risk of losing the assets or that the need for 
restraint is so great that it outweighs any hardship to the affected 
parties. Instead, the indictment or information need only allege 
that the property sought to be restrained would be subject to forfei-
ture in the event of conviction.107 Furthermore, unlike preindict-
ment orders, there are no specific time constraints; the restraints 
may last as long as necessary. Still, even after an indictment, the 
government's power over a defendant's assets is limited to restraint 
measures designed to preserve the availability of property for any 
ultimate forfeiture. Despite allegations of wrongdoing, the defen-
dant retains his interest in the potentially forfeitable assets. 
100. 18 u.s.c. § 1963(d)(2) {1988). 
101. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(l)(B) (1988). 
102. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(l)(B)(i) (1988). 
103. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(l)(B)(ii) (1988). 
104. 18 u.s.c. § 1963(d)(l) (1988). 
105. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(l) (1988). As with subsection (d)(2) restraints, this time limit 
may be extended upon a showing of good cause or upon the filing of an indictment or infor-
mation. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(l) (1988). 
106. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(l)(A) (1988). 
107. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(l)(A) (1988). 
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Upon conviction, however, any protection for a defendant's 
property completely dissipates.1os The defendant loses all rights to 
his tainted assets; such property is automatically forfeited to the 
government.109 Moreover, if any portion of these funds are un-
available, the court may order the defendant to make up the differ-
ence through the forfeiture of untainted, substitute assets.110 
The foregoing analysis shows that with respect to impositions 
upon tainted assets, Congress has provided greater procedural pro-
tections for defendants at the early stages of a prosecution. It is 
entirely consistent, therefore, for Congress to ·provide greater pro-
cedural protections for substitute assets during pretrial stages. 
B. Congressional Concern About Substitute Assets 
As demonstrated in section I.B, RICO treats tainted and substi-
tute assets differently.111 Congress displayed far greater caution in 
dealing with substitute assets than with tainted assets: RICO pro-
vides that courts may only order the forfeiture of substitute assets 
as a "last-resort" measure.112 This more cautious approach makes 
sense, given that defendants obtain substitute assets through legiti-
mate activities. Accordingly, the government should not restrain 
such property without providing considerable procedural 
safeguards. 
By contrast, the government may more readily restrain tainted 
assets. In Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 113 the Supreme Court 
drew an analogy between tainted assets and robbery proceeds that 
helps explain why a defendant has no legitimate possessory interest 
in tainted property. In Caplin & Drysdale, the Court held that the 
CCE's restraint provision does not impinge upon the defendant's 
Sixth Amendment right to an attorney of his choice.114 In so hold-
ing, the Court compared tainted assets under the CCE to the pro-
ceeds of a robbery. The Court stated that a "robbery suspect ... 
has no Sixth Amendment right to use funds he has stolen from a 
bank to retain an attorney," because "[t]he money, though in his 
possession, is not rightfully his."115 Because tainted assets, like the 
proceeds of a robbery, are not rightfully in the defendant's posses-
108. See Scheier, supra note 88, at 936 (concluding that "it is not bold to speculate that 
the Congress intended to treat the assets of a convicted criminal different[ly] than the assets 
of an accused prior to an adjudication of guilt"). 
109. 18 U.S.C. § 1963{a) {1988). 
110. 18 U.S.C. § 1963{m) {1988). 
111. See supra notes 34-47 and accompanying text 
112. See supra notes 37-47 and accompanying text (discussing the safeguards imposed on 
dispositions of a defendant's substitute assets). · 
113. 491 U.S. 617 {1989). 
114. 491 U.S. at 624-33. 
115. 491 U.S. at 626. 
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sion, the defendant has no legitimate possessory interest in the as-
sets, and RICO may therefore provide for their restraint before 
conviction. 
This rationale, however, does not extend to assets which lack a 
nexus with the illegal conduct. Substitute assets are acquired in a 
legal manner and are not subsequently used to further an illegal 
purpose. The defendant therefore should have a legitimate posses-
sory interest in them. Given this legitimate interest, it is logical for 
Congress to be concerned about the adverse impact on the defend-
ant whose substitute assets are frozen under RICO's pretrial re-
straint powers. 
The cautious approach required by substitute assets' lack of a 
connection with an illegal activity explains why Congress might re-
fuse to authorize the pretrial restraint of substitute assets. The 1986 
enactment of a substitute asset provision indicates that Congress 
finally decided that the forfeiture of assets that have no nexus with 
the RICO offense is a necessary tool in the war against organized 
crime. The ultimate forfeiture of such assets is only a postconvic-
tion remedy, however, and as discussed above,116 RICO's forfeiture 
provisions manifest far less concern with defendant's property in-
terests117 once the trier of fact has determined guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. Consequently, even though Congress has decided 
that postconviction confiscations of substitute assets are allowable, 
it does not necessarily follow that Congress has also concluded that 
preconviction impositions are permissible as well. Indeed, because 
Congress's legislative efforts with respect to RICO indicate a cau-
tious approach toward both pretrial phases and substitute assets, it 
seems consistent for Congress to refuse to give courts the authority 
to reach property with no connection to the crime before trial. 
CONCLUSION 
RICO's forfeiture provisions do not permit the pretrial restraint 
of substitute assets. The pretrial restraint provision's explicit refer-
ence only to tainted assets indicates that courts do not have the au-
thority to enter restraining orders against substitute assets. In 
addition, the legislative history accompanying RICO lacks any clear 
expression of contrary intent that would permit courts to ignore the 
plain language of the statute. Instead, this history reveals Con-
gress's desire to limit RICO's restraint powers to tainted funds. 
Congress also had good reasons not to allow for the pretrial re-
straint of substitute property. RICO is much more circumspect 
116. See supra Part III.A. 
117. Often, third-party rights are also implicated by RICO's pretrial restraint measures, 
since an innocent third party may claim an interest in the property subject to § 1963(d) 
restraints. 
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when dealing with both pretrial proceedings and substitute assets 
than with postconviction proceedings and tainted assets. Given this 
concern about RICO's reach in pretrial phases and with regard to 
substitute assets, it does not seem surprising that Congress provided 
for the forfeiture of substitute assets upon conviction but balked at 
the restraint of such property before trial. Accordingly, when fu-
ture courts are faced with government requests for the entry of re-
straining orders against substitute assets, they should decline the 
opportunity to stretch an already expansive provision to include all 
of a defendant's assets. 
